21.04.2009 r.
Wystąpienie Posła Krzysztofa Liska podczas Konferencji w Brukseli poświęcone Partnerstwu Wschodniemu
Pełna treść wystąpienia w języku angielskim:
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me use this excellent opportunity to express my view on the Eastern Partnership initiative being a new but badly needed call for more efficient European Neighborhood Policy.
Eastern Partnership
1 Let me put on the table a few general remarks at the beginning. The development and prosperity on the European continent require not only further progress in integration of the EU countries as well as new acts enhancing the EU cohesion but also specific decisions strengthening the EU external policy that will support cooperation between all European states in a more effective way.,. The EU should pay more attention to closer cooperation with its European neighbours, while strengthening its internal structures.
2 The interests of the EU member states and entire Europe require that we reduce the gap in the economic and social development between the EU and the East, in order to minimize the risk of spreading negative socio-political phenomena from the East to the West. . Furthermore, the EU should strengthen promotion of its standards, values and norms, and support their implementation in the adjacent countries by establishment of real partnership relations with the Eastern states.
3 Therefore the EU should develop a policy which would be more productive in achieving abovementioned goals and adjusted to current challenges as well as to our Eastern partners’ needs.
4 The recent events in Eastern Europe proved that it’s high time to strengthen the EU policy in this field. Such steps are needed if we expect the EU to be a decisive, effective and powerful organisation. The European Union needs a new positive and dynamic agenda for its Eastern partners. The Eastern Partnership is a unique chance both for the EU and the Eastern partners to strengthen stability and prosperity of Europe.
5 We consider the adoption of the Eastern Partnership initiative by the European Council in March to be a vital step forward on this path. We contentedly see the supportive approach of the EU and Eastern partners for that ambitious initiative.
6 The Eastern Partnership creates a new structure for tightening cooperation with Eastern partners, complementing the emerging architecture of the EU relations with neighbouring regions and states, embodied in the Union for the Mediterranean, the Strategic Partnership with Russia, the Black Sea Synergy and the EU strategy on Central Asia.
7 The Partnership is an open offer to establish closer, constructive relations between the EU and the states and societies of the Eastern part of Europe. It has the purpose of supporting transformation in the countries covered by the EP program in a way that will stimulate their economic development, strengthen democracy, freedom and civil societies, enhance law, administrative capacities and procedures – all for the purpose of approximating them to the EU standards. Let me know focus on some specific elements of the initiative.
• The Eastern Partnership presents the same offer to all Eastern partners. However, the differentiation principle gives the willing partners chance to develop cooperatation with the EU at a faster pace.
• The initiative is based on two pillars: deepened bilateral cooperation between the EU and its Eastern partners, and multilateral cooperation between the EU and the East European region. The bilateral cooperation concerns i.a.: political association, further economic integration between the EU and the Eastern partners, full visa liberalization and strengthening of energy security cooperation. The multilateral framework envisages:
- establishment of thematic platforms with respect to: 1) Democracy, good governance and stability; 2) Economic integration and convergence with EU policies; 3) Energy security; 4) Contacts between people
- launching of five Flagship Initiatives.
8 The Eastern Partnership does not prejudge any shape of future relations between the EU and the Eastern partners; it initiates a difficult and long–term process of approximation towards the EU acquis, towards the real integration.
9 The initiative is aimed at building genuine partnership between the EU and the Eastern partners that will bring mutual benefits. The Eastern Partnership, as such, cannot be perceived as an EU attempt to build a new sphere of influence. The EU intends to build strengthened partnership, based on common values, with the EU Eastern neighbours through various initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy and the EU strategy on Central Asia.
Now, let me say a few word about Russia. Although Russia is not covered by Eastern Partnership, but we cannot pretend that it is not there, especially after war in the South Caucasus and gas crisis.
Russia
1 The EU-Russia relations should be regarded as dynamic and fruitful both in the EU-Russia dimension and in the dimension of bilateral relations between individual Member States and Russia. At the same time the sense of mutual dependence between the EU and Russia must not dominate over the sense of mutual benefits which derives from common ventures undertaken by 4 Common Spaces. We can achieve the aforementioned goal by creating conditions to fully implement the ideas of 4 Common Spaces. This should be the basic direction of complex EU political activities undertaken as a part of multifaceted dialogue with Russia.
2 The European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes, that we have witnessed and participated in, lead to widening of the scope of security and stability on our continent. The fact that countries of Central Europe have joined the EU and NATO not only guarantees their social and economic development as well as mutual political-military co-operation but also constitutes good basis for relations between the West and present-day Russia. The EU, by developing strategic partnership with Russia, makes such relations more predictable. Moreover, such process leads to supporting transformation in Russia. At the same time the aforementioned partnership should not require special treatment of Russia, as it would not encourage this country to accept our common values. Quite the opposite – it might, in certain circumstances, lead to replacement of the principles based on universal values by special “recipes”, which would be subdued to the fulfilment of temporary and short-term tasks instead of reaching long-term and strategic goals.
3 As the negotiations of the new EU/Russia Agreement are underway, the EU should work out transparent rules of co-operation with Russia. That concerns not only political relations, but also trade and economic area, particularly in energy. Russia’s fulfilment of the obligations in the aforementioned areas will be the test of its reliability.
Ukraine
1 While looking specifically at the countries covered by the Eastern Partnership, it is Ukraine that comes first bearing in mind its key role in building European security. With no doubt, Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO would positively contribute to the stability and prosperity of the European continent.
2 EU is deeply concerned by the political instability in Ukraine, by the deep economic crisis, the struggle for power between the President and the Prime Minister, social dissatisfaction and the unstable situation on the Crimean Peninsula. Those factors may threaten the momentum of the internal reforms which are being implemented. But despite the above mentioned problems, the probability, that Ukraine would change its pro-European course is not high. Ukrainian elites seem to be unanimous about the need of close cooperation with the EU. The best example that in difficult times the nation can unite around a common goal is the recent decision made by the Supreme Council of Ukraine to adopt a part of the anti-crisis package, namely anincrease of the excise duty for alcohol and tobacco products. Hopefully in the near future other acts will be adopted which would enable Ukraine to receive the second tranche of the credit from the International Monetary Fund. It’s in Europe’s best interest to help Ukraine with the implementation of the internal reforms.
3 Ukraine politicians should confirm their declarations of will to strengthen the bonds between Ukraine and the Western world by their deeds, that is by specific reforms.
4 Talking about the EU-Ukraine relations, it is necessary to underline a good pace of negotiations of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep Free Trade Agreement (DFTA), as well as the adoption of Paris Declaration in September 2008. The declaration recognized Ukraine as a European state and its linkage with the EU member states not only by common history but also by common values, giving the agreement between the EU and Ukraine the name of an Association Agreement, making a record about the perspective of lifting the visa regime for Ukrainian citizens in the long term.
5 Due to the recent information from Brussels of slowing the pace and certain institutional difficulties indicated by Kiev, that occurred during the DFTA negotiation process, it would be advisable to consider providing support to Ukraine in the field of developing human resources for the negotiation process.
6 EU should seek to establish a road map to achieve a visa-free movement, based on the Balkan model and to make it easier for Ukrainian citizens to obtain visas e.g. by reducing the fees and expanding the infrastructure of the border crossings between Poland and Ukraine.
7 The statement that the current draft agreement does not prejudge the shape of future relations between the EU and Ukraine, indicates that in the future there will be a possibility of Ukraine’s full integration with the EU. The European Union should send a clear signal to its Ukrainian partner, that on the basis of common values, it will be possible to further deepen mutual relations with Ukraine up to its accession to the EU.
8 Furthermore, the support for sectoral reforms in Ukraine at expert level is crucial for Ukraine to become a part ofthe European structures. This should be easier after the Coordination Office of the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration was created within the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on November 6, 2008. The Coordination Office was set up to develop strategic decisions concerning Ukraine's rapprochement to the EU and NATO.
Belarus
9 Let me now turn your attention a difficult case of Belarus. Belarus has been sending signals of slight progress on its way to democracy and liberalization of political life. Main achievements of Minsk in this respect are: the permission for publication of two independent newspapers and registration of the “For Freedom“ movement, headed by A. Milinkevich. Such policy is likely to invigorate dialogue between the EU and Belarus and stimulate further changes in the internal situation of the country.
10 At the same time one should note further harassment of social activists and opposition leaders that illustrates the complicated nature of the dialogue with Minsk.
11 The Eastern Partnership initiative offers new mechanisms that hopefully will enable effective cooperation with Minsk in several fields as well as effective dialogue concerning human rights issues.
South Caucasus
1 Last but not least the EU engagement in the South Caucasus region becomes of vital importance. The EU and its member states have undertaken a series of actions to support the process of modernization and democratization, in accordance with the European standards and values. The EU made use of a wide range of instruments and various assistance programmes implemented under the auspices of the European Commission. The EU has also created a post of its Special Representative for Southern Caucasus with a broad mandate covering democratization, building of the rule-of-law and civil society as well as protracted conflicts in the region. Since August 2008 the EU and its member states have been involved in delivering humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance to Georgia. The conference on economic rehabilitation of Georgia has been organized in Brussels by the European Commission and the World Bank in November 2008, gathering institutional and state donors from all over the world.
2 What is more, the EU with its Monitoring Mission plays now a distinctive role in the conflict-resolution process in Georgia. The reflection of the future role of the EU among other international structures involved in Georgia is needed in order to reassure the continuity and efficiency of its engagement.
3 It is important to note, that the EU has always promoted political dialogue between authorities and opposition as the key instrument for achieving social and political stability. This is also the case of South Caucasian countries.
4 Do not forget about energy dimension. The South Caucasus region is the emerging hub of the main energy supply transportation routes from Central Asia to Europe. The EU takes it seriously into consideration, bearing in mind the recent decisions on its key energy projects (e.g. the Nabucco Pipeline). The EU support for the countries of South Caucasus will hopefully contribute to the reinforcement of stability and economic development in the region.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I sketched this picture of the EU relations with its Eastern neighbors to demonstrate how significant this region is and is going to be in the future for the EU development and, more generally, for the stability in the European continent. The EU, which desperately wants to be perceived as a global actor, is not going to be given this credit if it fails to develop coherent and effective policies to adjacent regions and countries. In this sense, Eastern Partnership is a step in right direction. It tries to address existing inefficiencies and give new impetus to European Neighborhood Policy showing that ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is rarely productive.

